

to be]. Sometimes his disagreement was clothed in the form of a fatherly admonition, but this could suddenly change and his speech and actions would become ironic, caustic, cynical. But never, even in these expressions of disagreement and dislike, did the man himself seem to appear. . . . Never any indication of directness. Himmler, when fighting, intrigued; when battling for his so-called ideas used subterfuge, deceit—not dueling swords, but daggers in his opponent's back. His ways were the ophidian ways of the coward, weak, insincere and immeasurably cruel. . . . Himmler's mind . . . was not a twentieth century mind. His character was medieval, feudalistic, machiavellian, evil.

It bears repeating that psychological trauma incident upon carrying out criminal orders to murder large groups of unarmed noncombatants in no way mitigates the crime. Indeed, such mental conflict is indirect evidence that the men of the Einsatzgruppen were well aware that what they were doing was criminal and evil even if the highest authority of the German state had ordered it.

## Final Solution

In October 1941 Stalin learned from a mole in the German Embassy in Tokyo, Richard Sorge, that the Japanese had decided to remain neutral in the German-Russian War rather than attack the Soviet Union from the east, through Mongolia, as Germany had proposed. The Japanese decided on neutrality to reserve their forces to fight the United States. Matching Sorge's information to other corroborating evidence, Stalin decided he could rely on it. He proceeded to transfer his entire Far Eastern army—some 250,000 men deploying 1,700 tanks and 1,500 aircraft—westward across Siberia to the Moscow front.

Siberian divisions began probing German forces south of Moscow as early as 18 November 1941, but the full-scale Soviet counterattack came on the night of 4–5 December 1941 all along the front. Russian winter and German overconfidence had left the Third Reich's armies ill-prepared, Panzer Group commander Heinz Guderian would argue to justify the heavy German losses that followed:

Only he who saw the endless expanse of Russian snow during this winter of our misery, and felt the icy wind that blew across it, burying in snow every object in its path; who drove for hour after hour through that no man's land only at last to find too thin shelter, with insufficiently clothed half-starved men; and who also saw by contrast the well-fed, warmly clad and fresh Siberians, fully equipped for winter fighting; only a man who knew all that can truly judge the events which now occurred.

(A few days later Guderian recorded an outside temperature of  $-63^{\circ}\text{F}$ ; "many men died while performing their natural functions," he wrote gruesomely, "as a result of a congelation of the anus.")

But even with fresh divisions, Soviet strength no more than matched German numbers. "The Red Army," writes Alan Clark, ". . . had no power to achieve, nor did the weather permit, a deep penetration in the manner of the summer battles. In the few cases where the Russians succeeded in surrounding their enemy they had neither the artillery to reduce them nor sufficient strength in the air to prevent their revictual-

ing by the Luftwaffe." Clark believes Hitler saved the day by taking personal command and refusing to allow his forces to withdraw. Moscow was spared invasion, however, and the Wehrmacht remained stalled before the Soviet capital in the worst winter in one hundred forty years.

In Hawaii the U.S. Pacific fleet lay unsuspecting at anchor in Pearl Harbor when Japanese carrier-based aircraft attacked on the morning of 7 December 1941. In two successive raids of 183 and 167 aircraft, the Japanese sank, capsized or damaged eight battleships, three light cruisers, three destroyers and four other ships, damaged or wrecked 292 aircraft and killed 2,403 American military and civilians. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared war on 11 December 1941 he did so against not only Japan but Germany and Italy as well.

Hitler responded the same day with a declaration of war against the United States. War against the United States as well as Great Britain and the Soviet Union meant world war to Hitler, war now enlarged to the scale of the conflict that had confirmed his anti-Semitic worldview. And world war was the catapult that would launch the consequences he had "prophesied" in his Reichstag speech of 30 January 1939:

If the Jewish international financiers inside and outside Europe succeed in plunging the nations into another world war, the result will not be the Bolshevization of the world and thus a victory for Judaism. The result will be the extermination of the Jewish race in Europe.

What to do with the Jews in Europe—and especially in the Greater Reich itself—was the question that was supposed to be discussed at a conference of SS leaders and government ministers on the Final Solution scheduled for 9 December 1941. When Heydrich had sent out invitations on 29 November 1941 he had emphasized the importance of the conference "particularly because Jews from the Reich territory, including the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, have been evacuated to the East in ongoing transports since 15 October 1941." Eichmann had organized it. "It was I who had to bustle over to Heydrich with the portfolio of invitations," he would brag in a memoir dictated from hiding in Argentina after the war. Abruptly on 8 December 1941 the conference was indefinitely postponed. New invitations went out on 8 January 1942 (Eichmann bustling over to Heydrich again), setting a new date of 20 January 1942 and explaining that the original meeting had been canceled "because of events that were announced suddenly, requiring the attention of some of the invited participants."

What were those events? The historian Christian Gerlach points to crucial meetings Hitler held in the wake of his declaration of war, meet-

ings that appear to mark Hitler's decision to have the European Jews directly murdered rather than annihilate them through attrition in camps and ghettos in the East.

Hitler met with his Reichsleiters and Gauleiters—the leaders of National Socialism, some fifty men—in his private residence in the Führer Chancellery on 12 December 1941, the day after his declaration of war in the Reichstag. Gauleiter Josef Goebbels paraphrased in his diary part of what Hitler told his oldest and closest comrades:

Regarding the Jewish question, the Führer is determined to clear the table. He warned the Jews that if they were to cause another world war, it would lead to their own destruction. Those were not empty words. Now the world war has come. The destruction of the Jews must be its necessary consequence. We cannot be sentimental about it. It is not for us to feel sympathy for the Jews. We should have sympathy rather with our own German people. If the German people have to sacrifice 160,000 victims in yet another campaign in the East, then those responsible for this bloody conflict will have to pay for it with their lives.

On 13 and 14 December 1941 Hitler met with key leaders of his occupation and killing operations: Philipp Bouhler, who headed the Führer Chancellery and thus the stalled euthanasia murder program; Alfred Rosenberg, Hitler's minister for the occupied Eastern territories; and at the second of the two meetings, Himmler. Rosenberg had drafted a speech earlier in December, before news of Pearl Harbor, that accused "New York Jews" of promoting "worldwide agitation against Germany" and threatened "corresponding measures against the Jews living in the East." In the Eastern territories, Rosenberg had proposed to say, "currently under the control of German armed forces, there are more than six million Jewish inhabitants. For more than a hundred years, eastern Jewry has been the source and spring of Jewish power throughout the world." In the draft speech he then threatened to "destroy . . . the springs from which the New York Jews had drawn their powers," promising "a negative elimination of these parasitic elements."

At the 14 December meeting Rosenberg gave Hitler a copy of the draft. Hitler "remarked that the text had been prepared before the Japanese declaration of war," the Ostminister noted afterward, "in circumstances that had now altered. With regard to the Jewish question, I said that my remarks about the New York Jews would perhaps have to be changed now, *after the decision*.\* My position was that the extermina-

\*Emphasis added.

tion of the Jews should not be mentioned. The Führer agreed. He said they had brought the war down on us, they had started all the destruction, so it should come as no surprise if they became the first victims." Gerlach comments:

By "the decision" Rosenberg could not have meant the entry of the United States into the war, for there is no logical connection between that event and the cessation of public threats against the Jews. Hitler's reaction indicates this as well, for he reiterates the justification for his decision to exterminate the Jews. Rosenberg certainly would have been informed immediately about such a decision, so this discussion on December 14 about the need to alter a speech that Rosenberg had written before December 7 indicates that the decision to "exterminate the Jews in Europe" must have been made after December 7 and before December 14, 1941.

Gerlach finds further evidence of a second Hitler decision on the Final Solution, this one for the European Jews, in the record of a speech Hans Frank made to his subordinates in Krakow on 16 December 1941; the speech echoes Hitler's speech to his Reichsleiters and Gauleiters on 12 December, a meeting that Frank attended:

As for the Jews, well, I can tell you quite frankly that one way or another we have to put an end to them. The Führer once put it this way: if the combined forces of Judaism should again succeed in unleashing a world war, that would mean the end of the Jews in Europe. . . . I urge you: stand together with me . . . on this idea at least: Save your sympathy for the German people alone. Don't waste it on anyone else in the world. . . . As a veteran National Socialist I also have to say this: if the Jews in Europe should survive this war . . . then the war would be only a partial success. As far as the Jews are concerned, I would therefore be guided by the basic expectation that they are going to disappear. They have to be gotten rid of. At present I am involved in discussions aimed at having them moved away to the east. In January there is going to be an important meeting in Berlin to discuss this question [i.e., Heydrich's delayed conference]. . . . Whatever its outcome, a great Jewish emigration will commence.

But what is going to happen to these Jews? Do you imagine there will be settlement villages for them in the Ostland? In Berlin we were told: Why are you making all this trouble for us? There is nothing we can do with them here in the Ostland or in the Reich Commissariat. Liquidate them yourselves! . . . For us too the Jews are incredibly destructive eaters. . . . Here are 3.5 million Jews that we can't shoot, we

can't poison. But there are some things we can do, and one way or another these measures will successfully lead to a liquidation. They are related to the measures under discussion with the Reich. . . . When and how this will all take place will be a matter for offices that we will have to establish and operate here.

Himmler met with Hitler at Wolfschanze on the afternoon of 18 December 1941. The "Jewish question" was the first subject on their agenda. Himmler had written the phrase in his notebook to remind himself to bring the subject up; during the meeting he made a note of the conclusion, which was an order from the Führer: "Jewish question / to be exterminated as partisans." Since most of the Soviet Jews within reach of the Einsatzgruppen had already been "exterminated as partisans," Gerlach argues that this December order must refer to the European Jews:

The war situation . . . created . . . a kind of European fortress mentality among the Germans. The new prospect of a second front, combined with the military defeat in the Battle of Moscow, had created a rather serious situation for the German leaders. Within this more threatening context, Hitler viewed the Jews as opponents, revolutionaries, saboteurs, spies, "partisans" in his own backyard—an area that now, in light of the expected United States attack, included all of Europe.

The delusion and paranoia implicit in Hitler's assumptions have become so familiar, and led to such monumentally horrific results, that hardly anyone any longer remarks on their lunacy. They emphasize once again how much Nazism had in common with religious cults where conversion to belief, transforming the personal identities of followers, requires incorporating the interpretive framework of the leader, however objectively bizarre. The difference with Nazism was that it parasitically commandeered the full resources of a modern nation-state. A similar ideological parasitism in the Soviet Union, Soviet Communism, led to a greater number of deaths, but they were spread across a longer period of time. So also in Communist China, with even more deaths there. Parasitic infestations of ideological fanaticism, it seems, caused most of the man-made deaths of the twentieth century.

Gerlach estimates that the first large group of euthanasia murder personnel from the Führer Chancellery left for Belzec around mid-December 1941. Gas vans at Chelmno, near Lodz, had begun exterminating Polish Jews on 8 December 1941.

Heydrich soon let Eichmann in on the secret, Eichmann told his interrogator Avner Less in Israel in 1960:

[At the turn of the year 1941/42] Heydrich sent for me. I reported. He said to me: "The Führer, well, emigration is . . ." He began with a little speech. And then: "The Führer has ordered the physical extermination of the Jews." These were his words. And as though wanting to test their effect on me, he made a long pause, which was not at all his way. I can still remember that. In the first moment, I didn't grasp the implications, because he chose his words so carefully. But then I understood. I didn't say anything, what could I say? Because I'd never thought of a . . . of such a thing, of that sort of violent solution. And then he said to me: "Eichmann, go and see Globocnik in Lublin, the Führer has already given him instructions. Take a look and see how he's getting on with his program. I believe he's using Russian anti-tank trenches for exterminating the Jews." As ordered, I went to Lublin, located the headquarters of SS and Police Commander Globocnik, and reported. . . . Globocnik sent for a certain *Sturmabführer* Höfle, who must have been a member of his staff. We went from Lublin to, I don't remember what the place was called, I get them mixed up, I couldn't say if it was Treblinka or some other place.\* There were patches of woods, sort of, and the road passed through—a Polish highway. On the right side of the road there was an ordinary house, that's where the men who worked there lived. A captain of the regular [Order] police welcomed us. A few workmen were still there. The captain, which surprised me, had taken off his jacket and rolled up his sleeves, somehow he seemed to have joined in the work. They were building little wooden shacks, two, maybe three of them; they looked like two- or three-room cottages. Höfle told the police captain to explain the installation to me. And then he started in. He had a, well, let's say, a vulgar, uncultivated voice. Maybe he drank. He spoke some dialect from the southwestern corner of Germany, and he told me how he had made everything airtight. It seems they were going to hook up a Russian submarine engine and pipe the exhaust into the houses and the Jews inside would be poisoned.

I was horrified. My nerves aren't strong enough . . . I can't listen to such things . . . such things, without their affecting me. Even today, if I see someone with a deep cut, I have to look away. I could never have been a doctor. I still remember how I visualized the scene and began to tremble, as if I'd been through something, some terrible experience. The kind of thing that happens sometimes and afterward you start to shake. Then I went to Berlin and reported to . . . [Gestapo head Heinrich] Müller. . . .

\*It was Belzec.

Then I was sent on to Kulm [Chelmno, west of Warsaw] in the Warthegau. I received orders from Müller to go to Litzmannstadt [Lodz] and report back to him on what was going on there. He didn't put it the same way as Heydrich . . . not as crassly. "An action against the Jews is under way there, Eichmann. Go take a look. And then report to me." I went to Gestapo headquarters in . . . Lodz . . . and there I was told. It was a special team, put in by the *Reichsführer*. And they told me exactly where this Kulm is situated. I saw the following: a room, perhaps, if I remember right, about five times as big as this one here. There were Jews in it. They had to undress, and then a sealed truck drove up. The doors were opened, it drove up to a kind of ramp. The naked Jews had to get in. Then the doors were closed and the truck drove off. . . . I don't know exactly [how many people the truck held]. The whole time it was there, I didn't look inside. I couldn't. Couldn't! What I saw and heard was enough. The screaming and . . . I was much too shaken and so on. I told Müller that in my report. He didn't get much out of it. I drove after the truck . . . and there I saw the most horrible sight I had seen in all my life. It drove up to a fairly long trench. The doors were opened and corpses were thrown out. The limbs were as supple as if they'd been alive. Just thrown in. I can still see a civilian with pliers pulling out teeth. And then I beat it. I got into my car and drove off. I didn't say another word. I sat there for hours without saying a word to my driver. I'd had enough. I was through. The only other thing I remember is that a doctor in a white smock wanted me to look through a peephole and watch the people inside the truck. I refused. I couldn't, I couldn't say another word, I had to get out of there. In Berlin I reported to *Gruppenführer* Müller. I told him the same as I've told you now. Terrible, an inferno. I can't. It's . . . I can't do it . . . I told him. . . . Müller never said anything. Never! Not about these things and not about other things.

Eichmann's descriptions document the developing transition from mobile to stationary gas chambers, which the transfer of T4 personnel to the East would accelerate. Mobile systems (killing squads or gas vans) facilitated killing victims whose communities the killers had invaded; stationary systems would facilitate killing victims shipped from large urban areas in Poland and from western Europe.

Heydrich convened the conference to discuss "the Final Solution of the Jewish Question" on 20 January 1942 at a columned official residence set amid gardens on the Wannsee, a popular public lake outside Berlin.

Present, Gerlach says, summarizing, "were five representatives from the Security Police and the SD, eight politicians and functionaries from the civil administration, and two representatives from the party, one from the party chancellery and one from the Race and Resettlement Office of the SS." Eichmann and Müller, now fully informed, were among them. "We called it the Conference of State Secretaries," Eichmann told Avner Less. It has come to be known as the Wannsee Conference.

Eichmann had organized the conference in the first place; he worked with a team of stenographers to summarize its proceedings in a protocol that survived the war. His Israeli interrogator sought his interpretation of that document's doubletalk:

LESS: I'm going to quote from your record of Heydrich's speech: "Emigration has now, with the Führer's approval, been replaced by another solution, the evacuation of the Jews to the East. The present actions, however, must be viewed as mere expedients, but they offer a source of practical experience of the utmost importance with a view to the Final Solution to come." What *does* all this mean?

EICHMANN: Since emigration was prohibited, they were to be deported to the East. This was the new—er—conception in behalf of which the conference of state secretaries was called. . . .

LESS: What is meant by "practical experience"?

EICHMANN: . . . Two months later, I was sent to see Globocnik. It is quite possible that the killing there had already begun.

LESS: I see. So you think "practical experience" refers to the killing of the Jews, which had already begun? It's true that action teams [i.e., Einsatzgruppen] were already at work at the time.

EICHMANN: They started in . . . Of course there was killing.

Eichmann was more candid about the Wannsee Conference discussions at his trial:

EICHMANN: What I know is that the gentlemen convened their session, and then in very plain terms—not in the language that I had to use in the minutes, but in absolutely blunt terms—they addressed the issue, with no mincing of words. And my memory of all of this would be doubtful, were it not for the fact that I distinctly recall saying to myself at the time: look, just look at Stuckart [Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart, State Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior], the perpetual law-abiding bureaucrat, always punctilious and fussy, and now what a different tone. The language was anything but in conformity with the legal protocol of clause and paragraph. . . . The discussion covered killing, elimination and annihilation.

But there is another, explicit admission of "killing, elimination and annihilation" hidden in plain sight in the Wannsee Conference protocol that has been consistently overlooked in historical evaluations of the document: the table prepared by SS statisticians of the distribution of Jews in Europe and the U.S.S.R. The table asserts a total Jewish population for western and eastern Europe of "over 11,000,000." The numbers for certain countries, however, are not original population totals but Einsatzgruppen numbers. Thus Estonia is listed as "*Judenfrei*." Latvia's Jewish population is counted at 3,500—in other words, the remainder of men kept alive in the Riga ghetto as "work Jews" after Rumbula. For Lithuania the number is 34,000, which corresponds closely to the 34,500 "work Jews" of Jäger's 1 December 1941 report. Bialystok, meaning essentially western Byelorussia, is counted at 400,000 and the rest of Byelorussia at the absurdly precise figure of 446,484, both numbers reflecting Einsatzgruppen depredations up to late 1941. If the Wannsee Conference protocol outlined responsibilities for the industrialized mass-killing program of the Final Solution yet to come, it also acknowledged, by deficit, responsibility for the handcrafted murder of the Final Solution already almost complete in the Ostland and the Ukraine.

The Wannsee Conference protocol thus projects 11 million Jews yet to be murdered despite the unrelenting murder that the Einsatzgruppen and Order Police had already accomplished in the East. Where did the SS statisticians find so many Jews? They did not merely confine themselves to areas that the Germans already occupied. The distribution table, which Heydrich implicitly endorsed, seemingly so factual and quantitative, can also be read as a fantasy of Nazi ambitions, a three-level document in which two of the levels are obscured: the missing hundreds of thousands already murdered in the Ostland and the Ukraine and the millions still beyond the SS's grasp. To arrive at the number 11 million, that is, the protocol included 700,000 Jews in "unoccupied France," 330,000 in England, 4,000 in Ireland, 8,000 in neutral Sweden, 18,000 in neutral Switzerland, 6,000 in friendly Fascist Spain, 55,500 in Turkey, 742,800 in friendly Fascist Hungary and 5 million more in the portion of the U.S.S.R. that the Wehrmacht was just then discovering it might not succeed in conquering even if it shed whole Wannsees of German blood. The grandiosity of the Nazi plan for the Final Solution—of Hitler and Himmler's plan—is appalling.

Much of the conference was devoted to debating the fate of special categories of Jews—"persons of mixed blood of the first degree," "persons of mixed blood of the second degree," marriages between "full Jews and persons of German blood" and between "persons of mixed blood

and persons of German blood." Resolving these category issues was a primary reason Heydrich had called the conference in the first place.

When it was over, Heydrich was relieved and satisfied. "Happily," he would write a month later, "[the conference] has settled the basic outlines for the practical implementation of the Final Solution of the Jewish question." His intention had been to establish his ultimate authority over the Final Solution. His colleagues in the government and the party had been more than willing to accede responsibility for the mass murder of eleven million people to the SS. "After the conference," Eichmann says in his memoir, "as I recall, Heydrich, Müller and your humble servant sat cozily around a fireplace. I noticed for the first time that Heydrich was smoking. Not only that, but he had a cognac. Normally he touched nothing alcoholic. The only other time I had seen him drinking was at an office party years before. . . . [So] we sat around peacefully after our Wannsee Conference, not just talking shop but giving ourselves a rest after so many taxing hours."

Heydrich had one other satisfying duty to perform that day: approving the awarding of a decoration, the War Service Cross Second Class, to nominees who had performed exceptional service to the state. The list included Blobel, a physician who had experimented with poison gas exterminations in Mogilev, three RSHA officials who had worked on gas-van development and a number of Einsatzgruppen officers.

Himmler rewarded himself for undertaking the Final Solution in western as well as eastern Europe by expanding his program to resettle the East with SS *Wehrbauern*. The new death camps which Globocnik was planning and constructing in eastern Poland in the winter of 1941/42—Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka—had been conceived to exterminate the Polish Jews, clearing the way for the pilot *Wehrbauern* program Himmler had assigned to Globocnik the previous summer. With an expanded Final Solution now authorized to exterminate all the Jews of both eastern and western Europe, Himmler began practical planning toward the full colonization of the East.

In January 1942 he instructed the chief of his settlement-planning department to enlarge his work from Poland alone to include the occupied territories of the East. On 31 January 1942 he wrote Oswald Pohl, who operated the SS's Economic and Administration Main Office, about the "absolutely huge buildings we wish to provide for the *Waffen-SS*, General SS and police." He estimated that the concentration camp system then just coming under Pohl's authority would have to produce eighty percent of the materials and construction for postwar SS needs, or

else it would not be possible to provide "either decent barracks, schools, office buildings, nor houses for our SS men in the old Reich, nor will I as *Reichskommissar* for the Consolidation of German Nationhood be able to provide the giant settlements with which we make the East German."

Separate but parallel conferences in Berlin and in Prague on 4 February 1942 attempted to sort out the complicated logistics of Germanizing the occupied territories. In Berlin Rosenberg's and Himmler's representatives agreed that most of the Eastern peoples were unsuitable for *Eindeutschung* and would have to be expelled, voluntarily or forcibly, into western Siberia. The representative from Himmler's Consolidation office drew on his (or Himmler's) classical education to compare the situation to the Spartan occupation of the Peloponnesus in the eighth century B.C.: the Germans were like the Spartans; the existing middle classes in the Ostland were like the Perioeci, a Peloponnesian middle class with no voting rights; and the Russians were like the helots, indigenous peoples whom the Spartans put to work on the land as slaves. Racial sorting, the conference participants concluded, could be disguised as physical examination for a health survey. In Prague Heydrich continued the discussions he had begun in October about the *Eindeutschung* of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Mass deportations, he told his subordinates, would also be necessary; racial sorting could be disguised as a nationwide survey for tuberculosis.

By March 1942, Hitler could tell a group of officers who had gathered to be awarded Iron Crosses, "I know exactly how far I have to go . . . so that the whole East becomes and remains German—*ur-German*. . . . We don't need to express our ideas about that now, and I will not speak about it. That [task] I have given to my Himmler and he is already accomplishing it."

What the task Hitler had given to Himmler would mean in human terms became evident when Himmler issued his master plan for the East, Plan Ost, on 27 April 1942. In anthropologist Eric Wolf's summary:

All Jews and Gypsies were to be eliminated, together with a quarter of the Russians. Thirty-one million inhabitants of Poland and the western Soviet Union were to be moved either to the General Government or to Siberia; 14 million of these were slated for eventual Germanization, while the rest were to serve the incoming ethnic German settlers from Eastern Europe and the South Tyrol. The General Government was to become a "gigantic Polish work camp," populated by [in Himmler's words] a "reservoir of manpower for unskilled labor." A document issued at the same time by the colonization division of the *Ostministerium* raised the number of people slated for removal to about 50

million but suggested that it was not enough to think in demographic and ethnic terms alone. It was important "to destroy the Russians as a people, separate and alienate them. It is essential that the majority of the people remaining on Russian territory be of a primitive, semi-European type."

The Final Solution—the systematic murder of the Jews of Europe and the Soviet Union—was intended to be only the first phase of a vast, megalomaniacal project of privation, enslavement, mass murder and colonization modeled on the historic colonization of North and South America and on nineteenth-century imperialism but modernized with pseudoscientific theories of eugenic restoration. The Einsatzgruppen and the Order Police had already far advanced the Final Solution in the East. After Hitler ordered the second phase of the Final Solution in December 1941, Western Jews began to be moved East in increasing numbers and murdered as well.

## *Judenfrei*

While the leaders of the Third Reich debated how to organize the second phase of the Final Solution, their allies in Romania had been busy slaughtering Jewish victims in the military regions they controlled in the southwestern Ukraine. Raul Hilberg summarizes the massacres perpetrated there in late 1941 and early 1942:

In the Golta prefecture the killings were carried out by the Romanians themselves. . . . Three primitive enclosures were organized in the district. . . . These hastily assembled concentration camps, which consisted of half-destroyed houses, stables and pigpens, held a total of 70,000 Jews, most of them from towns and hamlets, some from Odessa. Disease, especially typhus, was rampant, and food was scarce. . . .

At Bogdanovca, the largest and most lethal camp, killings began on December 21. At first, 4,000 to 5,000 sick and infirm Jews were placed in several stables, which were covered with straw, sprinkled with gasoline, and torched. While the stables were still burning, about 43,000 Jews were marched through the woods in groups of 300 to 400 to be shot, kneeling completely naked in the icy weather on the rim of a precipice. This operation continued until December 30, with an interruption for the celebration of Christmas. During January and February 1942, about 18,000 Jews were killed in [one of the smaller enclosures]. At [the smallest enclosure] where [Lieutenant Colonel Modest Isopescu] took pleasure in tormenting and photographing his victims, 4,000 were killed.\*

By January 1942 as well, some 2 million Russian prisoners of war were dead, 600,000 of whom had been shot outright, 140,000 of those by Einsatzkommandos. (By the end of the war, of more than 5.7 million Russian combatants captured, 3.3 million would be dead, most of them victims of starvation and exposure in open enclosures that the Wehrmacht murderously surrounded with electrified barbed wire while deny-

\*In all, Romanian forces murdered some 260,000 Romanian and 100,000 Ukrainian Jews during the Second World War.